Abstract. This paper presents three methods for strengthening public key cryptosystems in such a way that they become secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. In an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack, an attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts, except for the exact object ciphertext to be cryptanalyzed. The rst strengthening method is based on the use of one-way hash functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions and the third on the use of digital signature schemes. Each method is illustrated by an example o f a p u b l i c k ey cryptosystem based on the intractability o f computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. Two other issues, namely applications of the methods to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems and enhancement of information authentication capability t o the cryptosystems, are also discussed.
Introduction
A considerable amount of research has been done in recent y ears, both from the theoretical BFM88, NY90, DDN91, RS92] and practical Dam92] points of view, in the pursuit of the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In such an attack, the attacker (cryptanalyst) has access to the deciphering algorithm of a cryptosystem. The attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts, obtain the matching plaintexts and use the attained knowledge in the cryptanalysis of an object ciphertext.
The theoretical results are appealing in that the schemes which e m bodythem are provably secure under certain assumptions. However, most of these schemes are impractical due to the large expansion of the resulting ciphertext. The recent and notable schemes by D a m g ard overcome the problem of impracticality, but they are totally insecure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks in which an attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm even after he or she is given an object ciphertext to be cryptanalyzed. The attacker is allowed to query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertext, except for the exact object ciphertext.
Adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks would impose serious problems on many services provided by modern information technology. T o illustrate the possible attacks, consider the case of a security-enhanced electronic mail system where a public key cryptosystem is used to encipher messages passed among users. Nowadays it is common practice for an electronic mail user to include the original message he or she received into a reply to the message. For instance, a reply to a message may be as follows ( this practice provides an avenue for chosen ciphertext attacks, as an attacker can send a ciphertext to a target user and expect the user to send back the corresponding plaintext as part of the reply. N o w suppose that a user Alice is in the process of negotiating, through the electronic mail system, with two other users Bob and Cathy who are rivals of each other in a business. Let c be a ciphertext from Bob to Alice. Naturally, Cathy w ould like to know the contents of the communications between Alice and Bob. Cathy can obtain the ciphertext c by e a vesdropping. However, it would be infeasible for her to extract its contents immediately. Instead, Cathy might try to discover implicitly the contents of c through discussions with Alice using the electronic mail. The problem facing Cathy is that she can not simply pass c to Alice with the hope that Alice would include the contents of c into her reply, as Alice would detect that c is actually a ciphertext created by Bob but not by Cathy. Nevertheless, if the cryptosystem is insecure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, Cathy might still be able to obtain indirectly what she wants in the following way 1. Send Alice ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 , : : : , c n , none of which is the same as the object ciphertext c.
2. Receive the matching plaintext messages (hopefully) and 3. Extract the contents of c by the use of information obtained from the n plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In this paper we present three pragmatic methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. The rst method is based on the use of one-way hash functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions and the third on the use of digital signature schemes. Each method is illustrated by an example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. Security of the three cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks is formally proved under reasonable assumptions.
In Section 2, we i n troduce notion and notations that are needed, and summarize various types of possible attack to cryptosystems. In Section 3 previous proposals together with their problems are reviewed. Our immunization methods are illustrated in Section 4, by three public key cryptosystems based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. Section 5 is concerned with two other issues, namely applications of the immunization methods to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems, such as the problem of factoring large composite numbers, and the addition of information authentication capability to the three cryptosystems. Finally Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
The reader is directed to ZS93] where the three cryptosystems are formally proved to be secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
Notion and Notations
We will be concerned with the alphabet = f0 1g. T h e length of a string x over is denoted by jxj, and the concatenation of two strings x and y is denoted by xjjy. The bit-wise exclusive-or of two strings x and y of the same length is denoted by x y. T h e i-th bit of x is denoted by x i and the substring of x from x i to x j , where i < = j, is denoted by x i j] . # S indicates the number of elements in a set S, and x 2 R S means choosing randomly and uniformly an element x from the set S. The Cartesian product of two sets S and T is denoted by S T.
Denote by IN the set of all positive integers, and by n a security parameter which determines the length of messages, the length of ciphertexts, the security of cryptosystems etc. As in the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal's public key scheme DH76, ElG85], p is an n-bit prime and g is a generator for the multiplicative group GF(p) of the nite eld GF(p). Both p and g are public. To guarantee the security o f cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem, the length n of p should be large enough, preferably n > 512, and p ; 1 should contain a large prime factor PH78, LO91]. Unless otherwise speci ed, all exponentiation operations appearing in the remaining part of this paper are assumed to be over the underlying groups. Note that there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between strings in n and elements in the nite eld GF(2 n ). Similarly, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between strings in n and integers in 0 2 n ; 1]. Therefore, we will not distinguish among strings in n , elements in GF(2 n ) and integers in 0 2 n ; 1].
A public key cryptosystem, i n vented by Di e and Hellman DH76], consists of three polynomial time algorithms (C E D). C is called a key-generation algorithm which, on input n, generates probabilistically a pair (pk sk) of public and secret keys. Following the tradition in the eld, when a security parameter n is used as input to an algorithm, it will be represented by the all-1 string of n bits which is denoted by 1 n . E is called an enciphering algorithm which, on input a public key pk and a plaintext message m, outputs a ciphertext c. Here m is chosen from a message space M n . D is called a deciphering algorithm which, on input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, outputs a message m or a special symbol meaning \no plaintext output". E and D satisfy the following unique decipherability condition, namely D(sk E(pk m)) = m.
There are four common types of attack to a cryptosystem, namely ciphertext only attacks, known plaintext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks Riv90]. Related attacks against digital signatures are fully discussed in GMR88].
In a ciphertext only attack, which is the least severe among the four types of attack, an attacker is given an object ciphertext and tries to nd the plaintext which is hidden in the object ciphertext.
In a known plaintext attack, an attacker has a collection of plaintext-ciphertext pairs besides an object ciphertext. The attacker may use the knowledge gained from the pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts in the cryptanalysis of the object ciphertext.
In a chosen plaintext attack, an attacker has access to the enciphering algorithm. During the cryptanalysis of an object ciphertext, the attacker can choose whatever plaintexts he or she desires, feed the enciphering algorithm with the desired plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. Note that this type of attack is always applicable to a public key cryptosystem, since the attacker always has access to the public enciphering algorithm.
In a chosen ciphertext attack, which is the most severe among the four types of attack, an attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm. The attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts and obtain the corresponding plaintexts. Then the attacker can use the knowledge obtained in the query and answer process to extract the plaintext of an object ciphertext.
Researchers further distinguish two forms of chosen ciphertext attack: indifferently chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. A n indi erently chosen ciphertext attack is also called a lunchtime attack or a midnight attack NY90]. In such an attack the ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm are chosen without being related to the object ciphertext. However the ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm may be correlated with one another. This form of attack models the situation where the attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm before he or she is actually given the object ciphertext.
In adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks all ciphertexts fed into the deciphering algorithm can be correlated to the object ciphertext. This form of attack is more severe than the indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks and it models the situation where the attacker has access to the deciphering algorithm even after he or she is given the object ciphertext. The attacker is thus permitted to give the deciphering algorithm any a vailable ciphertexts, except for the exact object ciphertext, and obtain the matching plaintexts. See the Introduction for a practical application where adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks would be a considerable threat.
Rabin pioneered the research o f constructing provably secure public key cryptosystems by designing a public key cryptosystem with the property that extracting the complete plaintext of an object ciphertext is computationally equivalent to factoring large numbers Rab79]. Goldwasser and Micali invented the rst public key cryptosystem that hides all partial information GM84]. The cryptosystem is a probabilistic one and it enciphers a plaintext in a bit-by-bit manner. A common drawback of these and many other cryptosystems is that, although secure against chosen plaintext attacks, they are easily compromised by c hosen ciphertext attackers. On the other hand, much progress has been made in recent years in the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. We will review this development, and point out problems and weakness of the proposed schemes.
Theoretical Results
Theoretical study into the construction of public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks was initiated by Blum, Feldman and Micali BFM88], who suggested the potential applicability of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to the subject. Naor and Yung carried further the study and gave the rst concrete public key cryptosystem that is (semantically) secure against indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks NY90]. Racko and Simon considered a more severe type of attack, namely adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, and gave a concrete construction for public key cryptosystems withstanding the attacks RS92].
In DDN91] Dolev, Dwork and Naor proposed a non-malleable (against chosen plaintext attacks) public key cryptosystem and proved that the cryptosystem is also secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
All of these cryptosystems are provably secure under certain assumptions. However since they rely heavily on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, the resulting ciphertexts are in general much longer than original plaintexts. This disadvantage makes the cryptosystems highly impractical and di cult to realize in practice.
Damg ard's Schemes
In Dam92], Damg ard took a pragmatic approach to the subject. He proposed two simple public key cryptosystems that appear to be secure against indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks. The rst is based on deterministic public key cryptosystems. Let (E 0 D 0 ) be the pair of enciphering and deciphering algorithms of a deterministic public key cryptosystem. Let (pk 1 s k 1 ) a n d ( pk 2 s k 2 ) betwo pairs of public and secret keys and h be an invertible one-to-one length- methods is the same | they all immunize a public key cryptosystem by appendi n g t o e a c h ciphertext a tag that is correlated to the message to be enciphered. This is also the main technical di erence between our proposals and Damg ard's schemes. The three methods di er in the ways in which tags are generated. In the rst method tags are generated by the use of a one-way hash function, in the second method by the use of a function chosen from a universal class of hash functions, and in the third method by the use of a digital signature scheme. The second immunization method is superior to the other two immunization methods in that no one-way hash functions are needed. This property is particularly attractive given the current state of research, whereby m a n y o n e -w ay hash functions exist, few are e cient, and even fewer are provably secure.
We will illustrate our immunization methods with cryptosystems based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal public key scheme. In Section 5, applications of the immunization methods to cryptosystems based on other intractable problems will be discussed. Denote by G the cryptographically strong pseudo-random string generator based on the di culty of computing discrete logarithms innite elds BM84, L W88, P er85]. G stretches an n-bit input string into an output string whose length can be an arbitrary polynomial in n. This generator produces O(log n) bits output at each exponentiation. In the authors' opinion, for practical applications the generator could produce more than 3n 4 bits at each exponentiation, without sacri cing security. Recently Micali and Schnorr discovered a very e cient pseudo-random string generator based on polynomials in the nite eld GF(p) (see Section 4 of MS91]). The generator can produce, for example, n 2 bits with 1:25 multiplications in GF(p). The e ciency of our cryptosystems to be described below can be further improved if Micali and Schnorr's pseudo-random string generator is employed.
A user Alice's secret key is an element x A chosen randomly from 1 p ; 1], and her public key is y A = g xA . It is assumed that all messages to be enciphered are chosen from the set P , where P = P(n) is an arbitrary polynomial with P(n) > = n. Padding can be applied to messages whose lengths are less than n bits. In addition, let`=`(n) be a polynomial which speci es the length of tags. It is recommended that`should be at least 64 for the sake of security.
Immunizing with One-Way Hash Functions
Assume that h i s a o n e -w ay hash function compressing input strings into`-bit output strings. A user Bob can use the following enciphering algorithm to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice. end When messages are of n bits, i.e. P = n, instead of the one-way hash function h the exponentiation function can be used to generate the tag t. In this case, the enciphering algorithm can be modi ed as follows: (a) Change the step 2 to \z = G(y x A ) 1 2n] ." (b) Change the step 3 to \t = g m ." The deciphering algorithm can be modi ed accordingly.
Immunizing with Universal Hash Functions
A class H of functions from P to `i s called a (strongly) universal class of hash functions CW79, W C81] mapping P-bit input into`-bit output strings if
for every x 1 6 = x 2 2 P and every y 1 y 2 2 `, the number of functions in H taking x 1 to y 1 and x 2 to y 2 is #H=2 2`. An equivalent de nition is that when h is chosen uniformly at random from H, the concatenation of the two strings h(x 1 ) and h(x 2 ) is distributed randomly and uniformly over the Cartesian product ` `. Wegman and Carter found a nice application of universal classes of hash functions to unconditionally secure authentication codes WC81]. Now assume that H is a universal class of hash functions which m a p P-bit input into`-bit output strings. Also assume that Q = Q(n) is a polynomial and that each function in H is speci ed by a string of exactly Q bits. Denote by h s the function in H that is speci ed by a string s 2 Q . The enciphering algorithm for Bob who wants to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice is the following:
Algorithm 3 E uhf (y A p g m )
1. x 2 R 1 p ; 1].
2. r = y x A .
3. z = G(r) can be applied to input strings whose lengths are not exactly k`. In particular, when k = d P e, they can be used to compress P-bit input into`-bit output strings. In this case, a function in H can be speci ed by a string of Q = P + (1+ )`bits, where 0 < = = P mod`< 1. This universal class of hash functions is particularly suited to the case where the length P of messages to be enciphered is much larger than the length`of tags. We refer the reader to WC81, S t i 9 0 ] for other universal classes of hash functions.
Immunizing with Digital Signature Schemes
Assume that h is a one-way hash function compressing input strings into n-bit output strings. Also assume that Bob wants to send in secret a P-bit message m to Alice. The enciphering algorithm employed by Bob is the following:
Algorithm 5 E sig (y A p g m )
1 end Similar to the cryptosystem based on the use of universal hash functions described in Section 4.2, security of the cryptosystem can also be improved by hiding the third part c 3 = ( h(m);xr)=k mod (p;1) with extra pseudo-random bits produced by the pseudo-random string generator G. In addition, when messages to be enciphered are of n bits, neither the one-way h a s h function h nor the pseudo-random string generator G is necessary. The enciphering algorithm for this case can be simpli ed by c hanging the step 4 of the above enciphering algorithm to \z = r." and the step 7 into \c 3 = ( m ; xr)=k mod (p ; 1)." The deciphering algorithm can be simpli ed accordingly.
The rst three parts (c 1 c 2 c 3 ) of the ciphertext represents an adaptation of the ElGamal's digital signature. However, since everyone can generate these parts, they do not really form the digital signature of m. This immunization method was rst proposed in ZHS91], where other ways for generating the third part c 3 in the ciphertext were also suggested.
In ZS93] i t i s p r o ved that, under reasonable assumptions, all the three cryptosystems are secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. We i n troduce in the paper an interesting notion called sole-samplability, and apply the notion in the proofs of security.
Extensions of the Cryptosystems
We have focused our attention on cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem in nite elds. The cryptosystems can also be based on discrete logarithms over other kinds of nite abelian groups, such as those on elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves de ned over nite elds Kob87, Kob89] . Another variant of the cryptosystems is to have a di erent large prime for each user. This variant can greatly improve practical security of the cryptosystems when a large number of users are involved.
Our rst two methods for immunization, namely immunization with one-way hash functions and immunization with universal hash functions, can be applied to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems. For example, the methods can be used to immunize the probabilistic public key cryptosystem proposed in BG85], which is based on the intractability of factoring large composite numbers. The methods might be extended further in such a w ay that allows us to construct from any trap-door one-way function a public key cryptosystem secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
Authentication is another important aspect of information security. I n m a n y situations, the receiver of a message needs to be assured that the received message is truly originated from its sender and that it has not been tampered with during its transmission. Researchers have proposed many, unconditionally or computationally, secure methods for information authentication Sim88]. We take the second cryptosystem which uses universal has functions as an example to show that our cryptosystems can be easily added with information authentication capability.
To do so, it is required that the sender Bob also has a pair (y B x B ) of public and secret keys. Information authentication is achieved by letting Bob's secret key x B beinvolved in the creation of a ciphertext. More speci cally, w e c hange the step 2 of the enciphering Algorithm 3 to \r = y xB+x A ." and the step 1 of the corresponding deciphering Algorithm 4 to \r 0 = (y B c 1 ) xA ." Although ciphertexts from Alice to Bob are indistinguishable from those from Bob to Alice, it is infeasible for a user di ering from Alice and Bob to create a \legal" ciphertext from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice. This property ensures information authentication capability o f the cryptosystem. It is not hard to see that computing g x1(x2+x3) from g x1 , g x2 and g x3 , and computing g x1x2 from g x1 and g x2 , are equally di cult. Therefore the authentication-enhanced cryptosystem is as secure as the original one.
The rst cryptosystem which is based on the use of a one-way hash function can be enhanced with information authentication capability in a similar way.
For the third cryptosystem, the capability can be added by simply replacing x, a random string chosen from 1 p ; 1], with Bob's secret key x B .
Conclusions
We have presented three methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against chosen ciphertext attacks, among which the second immunization method based on the use of universal hash functions is particularly attractive in that no one-way hash functions are needed. Each i m m unization method is illustrated by an example of a public key cryptosystem based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite elds. The generality o f our immunization methods is shown by their applicability to public key cryptosystems based on other intractable problems, such as that of factoring large composite numbers. An enhancement of information authentication capability to the example cryptosystems has also been suggested.
